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Abstract—We determine the capacity of the classical compound
quantum wiretapper channel with channel state information
at the transmitter. Moreover we derive a lower bound on the
capacity of this channel without channel state information and
determine the capacity of the classical quantum compound
wiretap channel with channel state information at the transmitter.
I. INTRODUCTION
The compound channel models transmission over a channel
that may take a number of states, its capacity was determined
by [6]. A compound channel with an eavesdropper is called a
compound wiretap channel. It is defined as a family of pairs
of channels {(Wt, Vt) : t = 1, · · · , T } with common input
alphabet and possibly different output alphabets, connecting a
sender with two receivers, one legal and one wiretapper, where
t is called a state of the channel pair (Wt, Vt). The legitimate
receiver accesses the output of the first channel Wt in the pair
(Wt, Vt), and the wiretapper observes the output of the second
part Vt in the pair (Wt, Vt), respectively, when a state t governs
the channel. A code for the channel conveys information to the
legal receiver such that the wiretapper knows nothing about the
transmitted information. This is a generalization of Wyner’s
wiretap channel [15] to the case of multiple channel states.
We will be dealing with two communication scenarios. In
the first one only the transmitter is informed about the index
t (channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter), while
in the second, the legitimate users have no information about
that index at all (no CSI).
The compound wiretap channels were recently introduced
in [9]. A upper bound on the capacity under the condition that
the average error goes to zero and the sender has no knowledge
about CSI is obtained. The result of [9] was improved in [5]
by using the stronger condition that the maximal error should
go to zero. Furthermore, the secrecy capacity for the case with
CSI was calculated.
This paper is organized as follows.
In Section II we present some known results for classical
compound wiretap channel which we will use for our result’s
proof.
In Section III we derive the capacity of the classical
compound quantum wiretap channel with CSI and give a lower
bound of the capacity without CSI. In this channel model the
wiretapper uses classical quantum channels.
In Section IV we derive the capacity of the classical
quantum compound wiretap channel with CSI. In this model
both the receiver and the wiretapper use classical quantum
channels, and the set of the states can be both finite or infinite.
Here we will use an idea which is similar to the one used in
[2].
II. CLASSICAL COMPOUND WIRETAP CHANNELS
Let A,B, and C be finite sets, P (A), P (B), and P (C)
be the sets of probability distributions on A, B and C,
respectively. Let θ := {1, · · · , T }. For every t ∈ θ let Wt be a
channel A→ P (B) and Vt be a channel A→ P (C). We call
(Vt,Wt)t∈θ a compound wiretap channel. Wnt and V nt stand
for the n-th memoryless extensions of stochastic matrices Wt
and Vt.
Here the first family represents the communication link to
the legitimate receiver while the output of the latter is under
control of the wiretapper.
Let X be a discrete random variable on a finite set
{x1, · · · , xn}, with probability distribution function pi :=
Pr(xi) for i = 1, · · · , n, then the Shannon entropy is defined
as
H(X) :=
n∑
i=1
pi log pi .
Let X be a discrete random variable on a finite set X with
probability distribution function PX , let Y be a discrete
random variable on a finite set Y with probability distribution
function PY , and let PXY be their joint probability distribu-
tion, then the mutual information between X and Y is defined
as
I(X,Y ) :=
∑
x∈X,y∈Y
PXY (x, y) log
PXY (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
.
Let N(x|xn) be the number of occurrences of the symbol x in
the sequence Xn. For a probability distribution P ∈ P (A) and
δ ≥ 0 let typical sequences and conditional typical sequence
be defined as :
T nP := {xn ∈ An : N(x|xn) = nP (x)∀x ∈ A} ,
1
T nP,δ := {xn ∈ An
: |N(x|xn)− nP (x)| ≤ δ
√
nP (x)(1− P (x))∀x ∈ A} .
An (n, Jn) code for the compound wiretap chan-
nel (Vt,Wt)t∈θ consists of stochastic encoders {E} :
{1, · · · , Jn} → P (An) and a collection of mutually disjoint
sets {Dj ⊂ Bn : j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}} (decoding sets).
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for
the compound wiretap channel (Wt, Vt) in the case with CSI
if there is a collection of (n, Jn) codes ({Et : t ∈ θ}, {Dj :
j = 1, · · · , Jn}) such that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ R ,
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,··· ,Jn}
∑
xn∈An
Et(x
n|j)Wnt (Dcj |xn) = 0 , (1)
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
I(J ;Znt ) = 0 , (2)
where J is an uniformly distributed random variable with
value in {1, · · · , Jn}, and Znt are the resulting random vari-
ables at the output of wiretap channels V nt .
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for
the compound wiretap channel (Wt, Vt) in the case without
CSI if there is a collection of (n, Jn) codes (E, {Dj : j =
1, · · · , Jn}) such that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ R ,
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,··· ,Jn}
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnt (Dcj |xn) = 0 , (3)
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
I(J ;Znt ) = 0 . (4)
Remark 1: A weaker and widely used security crite-
rion is obtained if we replace (2), respectively (4), with
limn→∞maxt∈θ 1nI(J ;Z
n
t ) = 0 .
In case with CSI, let p′t(xn) :=
{
pnt (x
n)
pnt (T npt,δ)
, if xn ∈ T npt,δ
0 , else
and X(t) := {X(t)j,l }j∈{1,··· ,Jn},l∈{1,··· ,Ln,t} be a family of
random matrices whose entries are i.i.d. according to p′t.
It was shown in [5] that for any ω > 0, if we set
Jn = ⌊2n(mint∈θ(I(pt,Vt)− 1n logLn,t)−µ⌋ ,
where µ is a positive constant which does not depend on j, t,
and can be arbitrarily small when ω goes to 0, then there are
such {Dj : j = 1, · · · , Jn} that for all t ∈ θ
Pr

 Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Wnt (D
c
j |X(t)j,l ) >
√
T2−nω/2


≤
√
T 2−nω/2 . (5)
Since here only the error of the legitimate receiver is analyzed,
so for the result above just the channels Vt, but not those of
the wiretapper, are regarded.
In view of (5), one has (see [5])
the largest achievable rate, called capacity, of the compound
wiretap channel with CSI at the transmitter CS,CSI , is given
by
CS,CSI = min
t∈θ
max
V→A→(BZ)t
(I(V,Bt)− I(V, Zt)) , (6)
where Bt are the resulting random variables at the output of
legal receiver channels. Zt are the resulting random variables
at the output of wiretap channels.
Analogously, in case without CSI, the idea is similar to the
case with CSI: Let p′(xn) :=
{
pn(xn)
pn(T n
p,δ
) if x
n ∈ T np,δ
0 else
and Xn := {Xj,l}j∈{1,··· ,Jn},l∈{1,··· ,Ln} be a family of
random matrices whose components are i.i.d. according to p′.
For any ω > 0, define
Jn = ⌊2n(mint∈θ(I(pt,Vt)− 1n logLn)−µ⌋ ,
where µ is a positive constant which does not depend on j, t,
and can be arbitrarily small when ω goes to 0, then there are
such {Dj : j = 1, · · · , Jn} that for all t ∈ θ
Pr

 Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Wnt (Dj(X)
c|Xj,l) >
√
T2−nω/2


≤
√
T2−nω/2 . (7)
Using (7) one can obtain (see [5]) that the secrecy capacity of
the compound wiretap channel without CSI at the transmitter
CS is lower bounded as follows,
CS ≥ max
V→A→(BZ)t
(min
t∈θ
I(V,Bt)−max
t∈θ
I(V, Zt)) . (8)
III. CLASSICAL COMPOUND QUANTUM WIRETAP
CHANNELS
Let A and B be finite sets, and let H be a finite-dimensional
complex Hilbert space. Let P (A) and P (B) be the sets of
probability distributions on A and B respectively, and S(H) be
the space of self-adjoint, positive-semidefinite bounded linear
operators with trace 1 on H . Let θ := {1, · · · , T } and for
every t ∈ θ let Wt be a channel A → P (B) and Vt be a
classical quantum channel, i.e., a map A→ S(H): A ∋ x→
Vt(x) ∈ H . We define (Vt,Wt)t∈θ as a classical compound
quantum wiretap channel. Associate to Vt is the channel map
on n-block V ⊗nt : An → S(H⊗n) with V ⊗nt (xn) := Vt(x1)⊗
· · · ⊗ Vt(xn).
For a state ρ, the von Neumann entropy is defined as
S(ρ) := −tr(ρ log ρ) .
Let P be a probability distribution over a finite set J , and
Φ := {ρ(x) : x ∈ J} be a set of states labeled by elements of
J . Then the Holevo χ quantity is defined as
χ(P,Φ) := S
(∑
x∈J
P (x)ρ(x)
)
−
∑
x∈J
P (x)S (ρ(x)) .
2
An (n, Jn) code for the classical compound quantum wire-
tap channel (Vt,Wt)t∈θ consists of stochastic encoders {E} :
{1, · · · , Jn} → P (An) and a collection of mutually disjoint
sets {Dj ⊂ Bn : j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}} (decoding sets).
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for
the classical compound quantum wiretap channel (Wt, Vt)t∈θ
with CSI if there is an (n, Jn) code ({Et : t ∈ θ}, {Dj : j =
1, · · · , Jn}) such that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ R ,
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,··· ,Jn}
∑
xn∈An
Et(x
n|j)Wnt (Dcj |xn) = 0 ,
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
χ(J ;Z⊗nt ) = 0 ,
where J is an uniformly distributed random variable with
value in {1, · · · , Jn}. Zt are the sets of states such that the
wiretapper will get.
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for
the classical compound quantum wiretap channel (Wt, Vt)t∈θ
without CSI if there is an (n Jn) code (E, {Dj : j =
1, · · · , Jn}) such that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ R ,
lim
n→∞maxt∈θ
max
j∈{1,··· ,Jn}
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnt (Dcj |xn) = 0 ,
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
χ(J ;Z⊗nt ) = 0 .
Theorem 1: The largest achievable rate (secrecy capac-
ity) of the classical compound quantum wiretap channel
(Wt, Vt)t∈θ in the case with CSI CS,CSI at the transmitter
is given by
CS,CSI = min
t∈θ
max
P→A→BtZt
(I(P,Bt)− χ(P,Zt)) . (9)
Respectively, in the case without CSI, the secrecy capacity of
the classical compound quantum wiretap channel (Wt, Vt)t∈θ
CS is lower bounded as follows
CS ≥ max
P→A→BtZt
(min
t∈θ
I(P,Bt)−max
t
χ(P,Zt)) , (10)
where Bt are the resulting random variables at the output of
legal receiver channels, and Zt are the resulting random states
at the output of wiretap channels.
Proof: 1) Lower bound
Let p′t, X(t), and Dj be defined like in classical case. Then
(5) still holds since the sender transmits through a classical
channel to the legitimate receiver. We abbreviate X := {X(t) :
t ∈ θ}.(
Analogously, in the case without CSI, let p′ Xn and Dj
be defined like in classical case, then (7) still holds.
)
For ρ ∈ S(H) and α > 0 there exists an orthogonal
subspace projector Πρ,α commuting with ρ⊗n and satisfying
tr
(
ρ⊗nΠρ,α
) ≥ 1− d
α2
, (11)
tr (Πρ,α) ≤ 2nS(ρ)+Kdα
√
n
, (12)
Πρ,α · ρ⊗n ·Πρ,α ≤ 2−nS(ρ)+Kdα
√
nΠρ,α , (13)
where a := #{A}, and K is a constant which is in polynomial
order of n.
For P ∈ P (A), α > 0 and xn ∈ T nP there exists an orthog-
onal subspace projector ΠV,α(xn) commuting with V ⊗nxn and
satisfying:
tr
(
V ⊗n(xn)ΠV,α(xn)
) ≥ 1− ad
α2
, (14)
tr (ΠV,α(x
n)) ≤ 2nS(V |P )+Kadα
√
n
, (15)
ΠV,α(x
n) · V ⊗n(xn) · ΠV,α(xn)
≤ 2−nS(V |P )+Kadα
√
nΠV,α(x
n) , (16)
tr
(
V ⊗n(xn) · ΠPV,α√a
) ≥ 1− ad
α2
, (17)
where a := #{A}, d := dimH , and K is a constant which
is in polynomial order of n (see [13]).
Let
Qt(x
n) := ΠPVt,α
√
aΠVt,α(x
n)·V ⊗nt (xn)·ΠVt,α(xn)ΠPVt,α√a
where α will be defined later.
Lemma 1 (see [14]): Let ρ be a state and X be a positive
operator with X ≤ id (the identity matrix) and 1− tr(ρX) ≤
λ ≤ 1. Then
‖ρ−
√
Xρ
√
X‖ ≤
√
8λ . (18)
With the Lemma 1, (11), (17), and the fact that ΠPVt,α√a
and ΠVt,α(xn) are both projection matrices, for any t and xn
it holds:
‖Qt(xn)− V ⊗nt (xn)‖ ≤
√
8(ad+ d)
α
. (19)
We set Θt :=
∑
xn∈T n
pt,δ
p′nt (x
n)Qt(x
n). For given zn and
t, 〈zn|Θt|zn〉 is the expected value of 〈zn|Qt(xn)|zn〉 under
the condition xn ∈ T npt,δ.
Lemma 2 (see [3]): Let V be a finite dimensional Hilbert
space, X1, · · · , XL be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables
with values in S(V) such that Xi ≤ µ · idV for all i ∈
{1, · · · , L}, and ǫ ∈]0, 1[. Let p be a probability distribution
on {X1, · · · , XL}, ρ =
∑
i p(Xi)Xi be the expected value
of Xi, and Π′ρ,λ be the projector onto the subspace spanned
by the eigenvectors of ρ whose corresponding eigenvalues are
greater than λdimV , then
Pr
(
‖L−1
L∑
i=1
Xi −Π′ρ,λ · ρ · Π′ρ,λ‖ > ǫ
)
≤ 2 · (dimV)exp
(
−L ǫ
2λ
2 ln 2(dimV)µ
)
. (20)
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Let V be the image of ΠP,α√a. By (12), we have
dimV ≤ 2nS(P )+Kdα
√
an
.
Furthermore
Qt(x
n)
= ΠPVt,α
√
aΠVt,α(x
n) · V ⊗nt (xn) · ΠVt,α(xn)ΠPVt,α√a
≤ 2−n(S(Vt|P )+Kadα
√
n)ΠPVt,α
√
aΠVt,α(x
n)ΠPVt,α
√
a
≤ 2−n·S(Vt|P )+Kadα
√
n · ΠPVt,α√a
≤ 2−n·S(Vt|P )+Kadα
√
n · idV . (21)
The first inequality follows from (16). The second inequality
holds because ΠVt,α and ΠPVt,α√a are projection matrices.
The third inequality holds because ΠPVt,α√a is a projection
matrix onto V .
Thus, by (20) and (21)
Pr

‖Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(X
(t)
j,l )−Π′Θt,λΘtΠ′Θt,λ‖ >
1
2
ǫ


≤ 2 · 2n(S(P )+Kdα
√
an)
· exp
(
−Ln,t ǫ
2
8 ln 2
λ · 2n(S(Vt|P )−S(P ))+Kdα
√
n(
√
a−1)
)
= 2 · 2n(S(P )+Kdα
√
an)
· exp
(
−Ln,t ǫ
2
8 ln 2
λ · 2n(−χ(P,Zt))+Kdα
√
n(
√
a−1)
)
.
the equality in the last line holds since
S(P )− S(Vt|P )
= S

∑
j
P (j)
∑
l
1
Ln,t
V ⊗nt (X
(t)
j,l )


−
∑
j
P (j)S
(∑
l
1
Ln,t
V ⊗nt (X
(t)
j,l )
)
= χ(P,Zt) .
Notice that ‖Θt − Π′Θt,λΘtΠ′Θt,λ‖ ≤ λ. Let λ := 12ǫ and n
large enough then
Pr

‖Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(Xj,l)−Θt‖ > ǫ


≤ 2 · 2n(S(P )+Kdα
√
an)
· exp
(
−Ln,t ǫ
3
16 ln 2
· 2n(−χ(P,Zt))+Kdα
√
n(
√
a−1)
)
≤ exp
(
−Ln,t · 2−n(χ(P,Zt)+ζ)
)
, (22)
where ζ is some suitable positive constant, which does not
depend on j, t, and can be arbitrarily small when ǫ goes to 0.
Let Ln,t = 2n(χ(P,Zt)+2ζ) and n be large enough, then by
(22) for all j it holds
Pr

‖Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(X
(t)
j,l )−Θt‖ > ǫ

 ≤ exp(−2nζ) (23)
and
Pr

‖Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(X
(t)
j,l )−Θt‖ > ǫ ∀t


= 1− Pr

⋃
t
{‖
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(X
(t)
j,l )−Θt‖ > ǫ}


≥ 1− T exp(−2nζ)
≥ 1− 2−nυ , (24)
where υ is some positive suitable constant which does not
depend on j and t.(
Analogously, in the case without CSI, let Ln =
2nmaxt(χ(P,Zt)+δ) and n be large enough, then we can find
some positive constant υ so that
Pr
(
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qt(X
(t)
j,l )−Θt‖ > ǫ ∀t
)
≥ 1− 2−nυ (25)
for all j.
)
Remark 2: Since exp(−2nζ) converges to zero double ex-
ponentially faster, the inequality (24) remains true even if T
depends on n and is exponentially large over n, i.e., we can
still achieve exponentially small error.
From (5) and (24), it follows: For any ǫ > 0, if n is large
enough then the event
⋂
t


Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Wnt (D
c
j(X )|X(t)j,l ) ≤ ǫ




∩

⋂
j

‖
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(X
(t)
j,l )−Θt‖ ≤ ǫ ∀t




has a positive probability. This means that we can find a
realization x(t)j,l of X
(t)
j,l with a positive probability such that
for all t ∈ θ, we have
Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Wnt (D
c
j |x(t)j,l ) ≤ ǫ ,
and
‖
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(x
(t)
j,l )−Θt‖ ≤ ǫ ∀j .
For any γ > 0 let
R := min
t∈θ
max
P→A→BtZt
(I(P,Bt)− χ(P,Zt)) + γ ,
4
then we have
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ R , (26)
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,··· ,Jn}
∑
xn∈An
Et(x
n|j)Wnt (Dcj |xn) = 0 ,
(27)
where Et is the random output of (X(t)j,l )l.
Choose a sufficiently large but fixed α in (19) so that for
all j it holds ‖V ⊗nt (x(t)j,l ) − Qt(x(t)j,l )‖ < ǫ . In this case, for
any given j′ ∈ {1, · · · , Jn} we have
‖
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V ⊗nt (x
(t)
j′,l)−Θt‖
≤ ‖
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V ⊗nt (x
(t)
j′,l)−
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(x
(t)
j′,l)‖
+ ‖
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(x
(t)
j′,l)−Θt‖
≤
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
‖V ⊗nt (x(t)j′,l)−Qt(x(t)j′,l)‖
+ ‖
L
(t)
n,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(x
(t)
j′,l)−Θt‖
≤ 2ǫ (28)
and ‖Ej
∑Ln,t
l=1
1
Ln,t
V ⊗nt (x
(t)
j,l ) − Θt‖ ≤ ǫ for any probability
distribution uniformly distributed on {1, · · · , Jn}.
Lemma 3 (Fannes inequality [14]): Let X and Y be two
states in a d-dimensional complex Hilbert space and ‖X −
Y‖ ≤ µ < 1e , then
|S(X)− S(Y)| ≤ µ log d− µ logµ . (29)
If J is a probability distribution uniformly distributed on
{1, · · · , Jn}, then from the inequality (28) and Lemma 3 we
have
χ(J ;Z⊗nt )
= S

Ej
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V ⊗nt (x
(t)
j,l )


−
Jn∑
j=1
J(j)S

Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V ⊗nt (x
(t)
j,l )


≤ |S

Ej
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V ⊗nt (x
(t)
j,l )

− S (Θt) |
+ |S(Θt)−
Jn∑
j=1
J(j)S

Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V ⊗nt (x
(t)
j,l )

 |
≤ ǫ log d− ǫ log ǫ
+ |
Jn∑
j=1
J(j)

S(Θt)− S

Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V ⊗nt (x
(t)
j,l )



 |
≤ 3ǫ log d− ǫ log ǫ− 2ǫ log 2ǫ . (30)
We have
lim
n→∞maxt∈θ
χ(J ;Z⊗nt ) = 0. (31)(
Analogously, in the case without CSI, we can find a
realization xnj,l of X
(t)
j,l with a positive probability such that:
For all t ∈ θ, we have
Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Wnt (D
c
j |xj,l) ≤ ǫ ,
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qt(xj,l)−Θt‖ ≤ ǫ ∀j.
For any γ > 0 let
R := max
P→A→BtZt
(
min
t∈θ
I(P,Bt)−max
t
χ(P,Zt)
)
+ γ ,
then we have
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ R , (32)
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,··· ,Jn}
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnt (Dcj |xn) = 0 .
(33)
From ‖∑Lnl=1 1LnV ⊗nt (xj′,l)−Θt‖ → 0 for n→ 0 it follows
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
χ(J ;Z⊗nt ) = 0 , (34)
for any probability distribution J uniformly distributed on
{1, · · · , Jn} in the case without CSI.
)
Combining (5) and (31) (respectively (34)) we obtain
CS,CSI ≥ min
t∈θ
max
V→A→BtZt
(I(V,Bt)− χ(V, Zt)) ,
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respectively
CS ≥ max
P→A→BtZt
(min
t∈θ
I(P,Bt)−max
t∈θ
χ(P,Zt)) .
2) Upper bound for case with CSI
Considering (Cn) is a sequence of (n, Jn) code such that
sup
t∈θ
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnt (Dcj |xn) =: ǫ1,n , (35)
sup
t∈θ
χ(J ;Z⊗nt ) =: ǫ2,n , (36)
where limn→∞ ǫ1,n = 0 and limn→∞ ǫ2,n = 0, J denotes the
random variable which is uniformly distributed on the message
set {1, . . . , Jn}.
Let C(Vt,Wt) denote the secretey capacity of the wiretap
channel (Vt,Wt) in the sense of [13]. Choose t′ ∈ θ such that
C(Vt′ ,Wt′) = mint∈θ C(Vt,Wt).
It is well-known, in information theory, that even in the
case without wiretapper (we have only one classical channel
Wt′ ), the capacity cannot exceed I(J ;Bt′)+ξ for any constant
ξ > 0. So the capacity of a quantum wiretap channel (Vt′ ,Wt′)
cannot be greater than
I(J ;Bt′) + ξ
≤ lim
n→∞
[I(J ;Bt′)− χ(J ;Z⊗nt′ )] + ξ + ǫ2,n
≤ [I(J ;Bt′)− χ(J ;Zt′)] + ǫ
for any ǫ > 0.
Since we cannot exceed the secrecy capacity of the worst
wiretap channel, we have
CS,CSI ≤ min
t∈θ
max
V→A→BtZt
(I(V,Bt)− χ(V, Zt)) . (37)
IV. CLASSICAL QUANTUM COMPOUND WIRETAP
CHANNEL WITH CSI
Let H be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space.
Let S(H) be the space of self-adjoint, positive-semidefinite
bounded linear operators on H with trace 1. For every t ∈ θ
let Wt respectively Vt be quantum channels, i.e., completely
positive trace preserving maps S(H) → S(H).
An (n, Jn, λ) code for the classical quantum compound
wiretap channel (Wt, Vt)t∈θ consists of a family of vectors
w := {w(j) : j = 1, · · · , Jn} ⊂ S(H⊗n) and a collection
of positive semi-definite operators {Dj : j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}} ⊂
S(H⊗n) which is a partition of the identity, i.e.
∑Jn
j=1Dj =
idH⊗n .
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for
the classical quantum compound wiretap channel (Wt, Vt)t∈θ
with CSI if there is an (n, Jn, λ) code (
{
wt := {wt(j) : j} :
t
}
, {Dj : j}) such that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ R ,
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
W⊗nt (wt(j))Dj
) ≥ 1− λ ,
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
χ(J ;Z⊗nt ) = 0 ,
where J is a uniformly distributed random variable with value
in {1, · · · , Jn}, and Zt are the sets of states such that the
wiretapper will get.
Theorem 2: The largest achievable rate (secrecy capacity)
of the classical quantum compound wiretap channel in the case
with CSI is given by
CCSI = lim
n→∞
min
t∈θ
max
P,wt
1
n
(χ(P,B⊗nt )− χ(P,Z⊗nt )), (38)
where Bt are the resulting random states at the output of legal
receiver channels, and Zt are the resulting random states at the
output of wiretap channels.
Proof: Our idea is to send the information in two parts,
firstly, we send the state information with finite blocks of finite
bits with a code C1 to the receiver, and then, depending on t,
we send the message with a code C(t)2 in the second part.
1) Sending channel state information with finite bits
For the first part, we don’t require that the first part should
be secure against the wiretapper, since we assume that the
wiretapper already has the full knowledge of the CSI.
By ignoring the security against the wiretapper, we have
only to look at the compound channel (Wt)t∈θ . Let W =
(Wt)t be an arbitrary compound classical quantum channel.
Then by [4], for each λ ∈ (0, 1) the λ-capacity C(W,λ) equals
C(W,λ) = inf
t
max
p
χ(p,Wt) . (39)
If mintmaxp χ(p,Wt) > 0 holds, then the sender can build
a code C1 such that the CSI can be sent to the legal receiver
with a block with length l ≤ log Tmintmaxp χ(p,Wt) . We need to
do nothing because in this case the right hand side of (38) is
zero.
Let c = 1−λ, then for any required upper bound δ = 2−c′ ,
with given c′ > 0, the sender can repeat sending this block
log c · c′ times, and the legal receiver simply picks out the
state that he receives most frequently to find out t with a error
probability ≤ δ.
The first part is of length l · log c · c′ = O(1), which is
negligible compared to the second part.
2) Message transformation when both the sender and the legal
receiver Know CSI
If both the sender and the legal receiver have the full
knowledge of t, then we only have to look at the single wiretap
channel (Wt, Vt).
In [7] and [8], it is shown that there exists an (n, Jn, λ)
code for the quantum wiretap channel (W,V ) with
log Jn = max
P,w
(χ(P,B⊗n)− χ(P,Z⊗n))− ǫ , (40)
for any ǫ > 0, where B is the resulting random variable at
the output of legal receiver’s channel and Z the output of the
wiretap channel.
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When the sender and the legal receiver both know t, they
can build an (n, Jn,t, λ) code C(t)2 where
log Jn,t = max
P,wt
(χ(V,B⊗nt )− χ(V, Z⊗nt ))− ǫ . (41)
Thus,
CCSI ≥ lim
n→∞
min
t∈θ
max
P,wt
1
n
(χ(P,B⊗nt )− χ(P,Z⊗nt )) . (42)
Remark 3: For the construction of the second part of our
code, we use random coding and request that the randomiza-
tion can be sent (see [7]). However, it is shown in [5] that the
randomization could not always be sent if we require that we
use one unique code which is secure against the wiretapper
and suitable for every channel state, i.e., it does not depend on
t. This is not a counterexample to our results above, neither to
the construction of C1 nor to the construction of C(t)2 , because
of following facts.
The first part of our code does not need to be secure. For
our second part, the legal transmitters can use the following
strategy: At first they bulid a code C1 = (E, {Dj : j =
1, · · · , Jn}) and a code C(t)2 = (E(t), {D(t)j : j = 1, · · · , Jn})
for every t ∈ θ. If the sender wants to send the CSI
t′ ∈ θ and the message j, he encodes t′ with E and j
with E(t′), then he sends both parts together through the
channel. After receiving both parts, the legal receiver decodes
the first part with {Dj : j}, and chooses the right decoders
{D(t′)j : j} ∈
{
{D(t)j : j} : t ∈ θ
}
to decode the second part.
With this strategy, we can avoid using one unique code which
is suitable for every channel state.
3) Upper bound
For any ǫ > 0 choose t′ ∈ θ such that C(Vt′ ,Wt′) ≤
inft∈θ C(Vt,Wt) + ǫ.
From [7] and [8], we know that the capacity of the quantum
wiretap channel (Wt′ , Vt′) cannot be greater than
lim
n→∞
max
P,wt′
1
n
(χ(P,B⊗nt′ )− χ(P,Z⊗nt′ )) .
Since we cannot exceed the capacity of the worst wiretap
channel, we have
CCSI ≤ lim
n→∞
min
t∈θ
max
P,wt
1
n
(χ(P,B⊗nt )− χ(P,Z⊗nt )). (43)
This together with (42) completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Remark 4: In [12], it is shown that if for a given t and any
n ∈ N
I(P,B⊗nt ) ≥ I(P,Z⊗nt )
holds for all P ∈ P (A) and {wt(j) : j = 1, · · · , Jn} ⊂
S(H⊗n), then
lim
n→∞
max
P,wt
1
n
(χ(P,B⊗nt )− χ(P,Z⊗nt ))
= max
P,wt
(χ(P,Bt)− χ(P,Zt)) .
Thus if for every t ∈ θ and n ∈ N,
I(P,B⊗nt ) ≥ I(P,Z⊗nt )
holds for all P ∈ P (A) and {wt(j) : j = 1, · · · , Jn} ⊂
S(H⊗n), we have
CCSI = min
t∈θ
max
P,wt
(χ(P,Bt)− χ(P,Zt)) .
So far, we assumed that |θ|, the number of the channels, is
<∞. Now we look at the case where |θ| can be arbitrary.
Theorem 3: For an arbitrary set θ we have
CCSI = lim
n→∞
inf
t∈θ
max
P,wt
1
n
(χ(P,B⊗nt )− χ(P,Z⊗nt )) . (44)
Proof: Let W : S(H) → S(H) be a linear map, then let
‖W‖♦ := sup
n∈N
max
a∈S(Cn⊗H),‖a‖1=1
‖(idn ⊗W )(a)‖1 (45)
where ‖ · ‖1 stands for the trace norm.
It is well known [11] that this norm is multiplicative, i.e.
‖W ⊗W ′‖♦ = ‖W‖♦ · ‖W ′‖♦.
A τ -net in the space of the completely positive trace
preserving maps is a finite set
(
W (k)
)K
k=1
with the property
that for each W there is at least one k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} with
‖W −W (k)‖♦ < τ .
Lemma 4 (τ−net [10]): For any τ ∈ (0, 1] there is a τ -
net of quantum-channels
(
W
(k)
t
)K
k=1
in the space of the
completely positive trace preserving maps with K ≤ ( 3τ )2d
4
,
where d = dimH .
If |θ| is arbitrary, then for any ξ > 0 let τ = ξ− log ξ . By
Lemma 4 there exists a finite set θ′ with |θ′| ≤ ( 3τ )2d
4
and
τ -nets (Wt′)t′∈θ′ , (Vt′)t′∈θ′ such that for every t ∈ θ we can
find a t′ ∈ θ′ with ‖Wt −Wt′‖♦ ≤ τ and ‖Vt − Vt′‖♦ ≤ τ .
For every t′ ∈ θ′ the legal transmitters build a code C(t′)2 =
{wt′ , {Dt′,j : j}}. Since by [7], the error of the code C(t
′)
2
decreases exponentially to its length, we can find an N =
O(− log ξ) such that for all t′ ∈ θ′ it holds
1
JN
JN∑
j=1
tr
(
W⊗Nt′ (wt′(j))Dt′,j
) ≥ 1− λ− ξ , (46)
χ(J ;Z⊗Nt′ ) ≤ ξ , (47)
Then, if the sender obtains the state information “t” , he can
send with finite bits “t′” to the legal receiver in the first part,
and then they build a code C(t
′)
2 that fulfills (46) and (47) to
transmit the message.
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For every t′ and j let ψt′(j) ∈ H⊗n⊗H⊗n be an arbitrary
purification of the state wt′(j). Then we have
tr
[(
W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′
)
(wt′ (j))
]
= tr
(
trH⊗N
[
id⊗NH ⊗ (W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′ ) (|ψt′(j)〉〈ψt′ (j)|)
])
= tr
[
id⊗NH ⊗ (W⊗nt −W⊗Nt′ ) (|ψt′(j)〉〈ψt′ (j)|)
]
=
∥∥id⊗NH ⊗ (W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′ ) (|ψt′(j)〉〈ψt′(j)|)∥∥1
≤ ‖W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′ ‖♦ · ‖(|ψt′(j)〉〈ψt′ (j)|)‖1
≤ Nτ .
The first equality follows from the definition of purifica-
tion. the second equality follows from the definition of
trace. The third equality follows from the fact that ‖A‖1 =
tr(A) for any self-adjoint, positive-semidefinite bounded linear
operator A. The first inequality follows by the definition
of ‖ · ‖♦. The second inequality follows from the facts
that ‖ (|ψt′(j)〉〈ψt′ (j)|) ‖1 = 1 and
∥∥W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′ ∥∥♦ =∥∥∥(Wt −Wt′)⊗N∥∥∥
♦
= N · ‖Wt −Wt′‖♦, since ‖ · ‖♦ is
multiplicative.
It follows
1
JN
JN∑
j=1
tr
(
W⊗Nt (wt′(j))Dt′,j
)
− 1
JN
JN∑
j=1
tr
(
W⊗Nt′ (wt′(j))Dt′,j
)
=
1
JN
JN∑
j=1
tr
[(
W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′
)
(wt′(j))Dt′,j
]
≤ 1
JN
JN∑
j=1
tr
[(
W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′
)
(wt′(j))
]
≤ 1
JN
JNN · τ
= Nτ . (48)
Nτ tends to zero when ξ goes to zero, since N =
O(− log ξ).
Let J be a probability distribution uniformly distributed on
{1, · · · , JN}, and {ρ(j) : j = 1, · · · , Jn} be a set of states
labeled by elements of J . By Lemma 3 we have
‖χ(J, Vt)− χ(J, Vt′)‖
≤ ‖S

 JN∑
j=1
J(j)Vt(ρ(j))

 − S

 JN∑
j=1
J(j)Vt′ (ρ(j))

 ‖
+ ‖
JN∑
j=1
J(j)S (Vt(ρ(j)))
JN∑
j=1
J(j)S (Vt′(ρ(j))) ‖
≤ 2τ log d− 2τ log τ , (49)
since by ‖Vt − Vt′‖♦ ≤ τ , it holds ‖Vt(ρ)− Vt′(ρ)‖ ≤ τ for
all ρ ∈ S(H).
By (48) and (49) it holds
max
t
1
JN
JN∑
j=1
tr
(
W⊗Nt (wt′(j))Dt′,j
) ≥ 1− λ− ξ −Nτ ,
χ(J ;Z⊗Nt ) ≤ ξ + 2τ log d− 2τ log τ .
Since Nτ and 2τ log d both tend to zero when ξ goes to zero,
we have
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
W⊗nt (wt′(j))Dt′,j
) ≥ 1− λ ,
lim
n→∞
χ(J ;Z⊗nt ) = 0 .
The bits that the sender uses to transform the CSI is large
but constant, so it is still negligible compared to the second
part. We obtain
CCSI > lim
n→∞
inf
t∈θ
max
P,wt
1
n
(χ(P,B⊗nt )− χ(P,Z⊗nt )) . (50)
The proof of the converse is similar to those given in the
proof of Theorem 2, where we consider a worst t′.
Remark 5: For Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we have only
required that the probability that the legal receiver does not
obtain the correct message tends to zero when the code length
goes to infinity. We have not specified how fast it should tends
to zero. If we analyze the relation between the error probability
ε and the code length, then we have the following facts.
In the case of finite θ, let ε1 denote the probability that
the legal receiver does not obtain the correct CSI, and let ε2
denote the probability that the legal receiver, having CSI, does
not obtain the correct message. Since the length of first part
of the code is l · log c · c′ = O(log ε1), as we defined in
Section IV, we have ε−11 is O(exp(l · log c · c′)) = O(exp(n)),
where n stands for the length of first part. And for the second
part of the code, ε2 decreased exponentially to the length of
the second part, as proven in [7]. Thus, the error probability
ε = max{ε1, ε2} decreases exponentially to the code length
in the case of finite θ.
If θ is infinite, let ε1 denote the probability that the legal
receiver does not obtain the correct CSI. Then we have to
build two τ -nets, each contains O((− log ε1ε1 )
−2d4) channels.
If we want to send the CSI of these τ -nets, l, as defined in
Section IV, will be O(−2d4 · log(ε1 log ε1)), this means here
ε−11 will be O(exp( n4d4 )) = O(exp(n)), where n stands for
the length of first part. So we can still achieve that the error
probability decreases exponentially to the code length in case
of infinite θ.
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